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FINE TUNING EXPLAINED? MULTIVERSES AND CELLULAR AUTOMATA 
Francisco José Soler Gil1 − Manuel Alfonseca2 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a 
real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue 
in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark's «mathematical multiverse» are 
too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But 
the «mathematical multiverse» is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have 
performed a number of experiments with cellular automata of complex behavior, which can 
be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what 
happens in some automata (in particular Conway’s «Game of Life») and the real world is 
very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we 
should expect to inhabit −in the context of the multiverse− a world in which at least some 
of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the 
probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. 
In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the 
hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for 
the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. 
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Introduction  
The hypothesis that the universe where we live represents, not the whole physical 
reality, but a particular domain inside a much larger reality called “multiverse,” which 
includes many other universes, has received in recent years increasing attention in 
cosmology. This is because the multiverse appears on the horizon of some lines of research 
independent of one another. One of these lines is the study of the peculiarities of the 
structure of the laws and constants of nature. Given the current state of our knowledge, 
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they seem very peculiar, in the sense that slight changes in those laws and constants would 
result in a universe unable to generate life, or indeed any form of complexity. Is the 
multiverse a good way to explain the peculiarities of the laws of nature? If so, such 
peculiarities would be simply an effect of the anthropic perspective: we can only observe 
the laws that are compatible with our existence. 
In this article3 we suggest arguments for the thesis that this explanatory strategy 
concerning the peculiarities of the laws and constants of nature of our universe does not 
work. This happens because the different models of multiverse never have the right size: 
either they are too small, and the question about the peculiarities of the laws is simply 
shifted to the multiverse level, or to avoid this, one must postulate a multiverse so large 
that the simplicity of the laws of nature in our universe becomes problematic. 
The first part of this argument -that almost all proposed multiverses are too small-, 
is well known in the specialized literature. All we have to do is to summarize the discussion 
here. However, to defend the second part -that a multiverse that avoids the previous 
problem becomes too big to understand the simplicity of the laws of nature in our world- 
we will offer a new argument. 
We begin by pointing out that one of the most remarkable peculiarities of the laws 
of nature is that they do not show (at least so far) any temporal variation. This is a very 
special feature, because there are infinitely many possible laws and constants with a form 
similar to those in our world, except that they show some time dependence. Living in a 
very general multiverse, we should not expect to inhabit a world like ours, unless time 
dependence of the laws of nature is incompatible with the development of complex 
structures such as those we observe in our world. Is this the case? 
In order to answer this question, we propose to study what happens to the 
structures generated by cellular automata. The reason for this suggestion is that there is a 
strong analogy between the structural properties of complex entities in our world (in 
particular, biological and chemical structures), and the structures that can be generated in 
certain cellular automata (those which are computationally complete, i.e. equivalent to a 
Turing machine or a digital computer). The analogy between both types of structures is so 
close, that cellular automata have been used for decades to support the study of issues such 
as the generation of complexity and the emergence of new properties in the evolution of 
life, the dynamics of ecosystems, neural interactions and so on. 
We will ask, then, what would happen if the cellular automata rules (the equivalent 
to the laws of nature) that make it possible to develop structural configurations closely 
similar to the complex structures in our world, were time-dependent4. 
                                                 
3 A preliminary (and extended) version of this article is available at arXiv under the title «Is the Multiverse 
Hypothesis capable of explaining the Fine Tuning of Nature Laws and Constants? The Case of Cellular 
Automata». See: http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4278  
4 The suggestion of using cellular automata as simple models of possible universes in a multiverse has been 
already used by Paul Davies in his paper DAVIES (2007), but the goal of Davies is to make use of the 
automata to prove his conjecture regarding the origin of the bio-friendly laws of the universe. We think, 
however, that Davies conjecture (which includes the idea of physics and biology co-evolving in such a way 
that an apparently teleological behaviour in the universe emerges) is very speculative. And it seems not easy to 
get support for such ideas through automata models. Therefore our aim is simply to explore the use of 
cellular automata to test the (somewhat more conventional) multiverse explanation of the peculiar features of 
the nature laws in our universe. 
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On the basis of the simulations we are currently performing, we answer tentatively 
that a temporal independence of the rules is not necessary for the survival of complex 
structures in the automata-worlds. Therefore, if the analogy is valid, this feature would not 
be necessary for the existence of complexity in our world, and the laws of our universe are 
thus much simpler than we should expect, if we really live in the multiverse. 
To develop this argument, the paper is divided into the following sections: 
In the first section we briefly review the reasons which led to the proposal of the 
multiverse hypothesis as a possible (and acceptable in principle) scenario in cosmology. 
In the second section, we consider some of the examples of fine tuning of the laws 
and constants of nature discussed in the latest years, since the use of the multiverse 
hypothesis to explain this type of data is what are questioning here.  
In the third section we discuss the issue of which version of the multiverse should 
be assumed to eliminate fully the problem of the fine tuning of the universe. We shall show 
that only the «mathematical multiverse» proposed by Max Tegmark prevents the question 
of fine tuning to surface again in the multiverse context. 
In the fourth section we suggest a way to test that hypothesis. We have selected 
cellular automata as examples of possible universes where we can test some of the 
«predictions» offered by Tegmark as regards the multiverse hypothesis. 
In the fifth section we detail the experiments we have performed with cellular 
automata with respect to Tegmark's «predictions». They try to show how the behavior of 
cellular automata is affected by changes in their rules −the equivalent to the laws of nature 
in a universe− concerning their ability to develop complex structures. 
In the sixth section we state the consequences of our study regarding the question 
of whether the multiverse hypothesis can explain the fine tuning of our universe. Our 
provisional answer is on the negative: if we accept the multiverse as the explanation of the 
fine tuning of universe, we should expect that the laws of this universe would be less 
simple than they are. In particular, it seems that we could expect that at least some of the 
laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. 
 
1. Three roads to the multiverse 
The hypothesis that our universe is only a particular domain within a much larger 
multiverse started to be considered a cosmological possibility in the last decade of the past 
century. Although a similar idea was offered in the fifties as a solution to the quantum 
measurement problem (Everett's «multiple worlds» interpretation), that problem is 
completely different from those tackled by the cosmologists upholding the multiverse 
hypothesis. Therefore, we will not consider here Everett's approach and its subsequent 
formulations. 
The confluence of three different lines of research explains why a hypothesis as 
speculative and risky as the multiverse has been taken seriously in the latest years. These 
lines are the following: 
(1) Inflationary cosmology. 
(2)  Diverse attempts to build a quantum gravity theory. 
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(3) Research on the effect that a small modification in the structure of physical 
laws would have on the development of complex beings and life as we 
know it. 
The multiverse question arises in the context of inflationary cosmology. The cosmic 
inflation hypothesis was proposed initially by Alan Guth in 1981. Guth was trying to 
explain two phenomena which the standard cosmological model does not explain: (1) the 
homogeneity of those regions in the universe which had never been able to interact [the so-
called horizon problem] and (2) the fact that the universe seems to be approximately flat, 
which entails that, in the beginning of the expansion, the density parameter of the universe 
must have had a value extremely near to the critic density [the so-called flatness problem]. 
Guth proposed that the universe experienced a process of exponential expansion 
between 
3710−  and 
3510−  seconds after the Big Bang. At the end of this stretch of time, 
inflation was replaced by an expansion similar to that described by the standard model, 
which would still be valid, except for its application to the first stages of the universe. 
The inflationary scenario offers an answer to the two mentioned questions. The 
horizon problem is solved because what today makes our observable universe proceeds 
from a very small region with mutual interactions before the exponential expansive phase. 
And the flatness problem is solved because the universe, as a consequence of inflation, has 
reached such dimensions that it appears to be practically flat, even though it may still 
possess some curvature. 
Meanwhile, the initial Guth model, together with several other proposals made to 
explain the mechanism of inflation, have been proved unfeasible. Currently, the model 
which appears to present less problems −developed mainly by Andrei Linde, Alex Vilenkin 
and co-workers− suggests that the cosmic inflationary process never ends, that the 
universe expands exponentially forever, while here and there different domains are being 
formed, one of them our observable universe, which are regions of a much larger physical 
reality: regions where the potential pushing the inflation has reached a minimum value, 
where the exponential growth of the cosmos has stopped. As these regions are causally 
disconnected from one another, it seems that, if we accept the inflationary hypothesis, we 
should also accept the existence of the multiverse. 
Another independent line of research which leads to the idea of the multiverse is 
the search for a quantum gravity theory. Briefly, it will suffice to say that we have at present 
two main different approaches towards this theory: the superstring hypothesis and the 
quantum loop theory, both of which end up in the idea of the multiverse. In the case of 
superstrings, the problem is that, instead of there being a single physical structure 
complying with the requirements considered fundamental for this frame, there are about 
50010  (or as some say, 
100010 ) possible structures. This is a regrettable situation, and the 
solution proposed by Susskind and others is that physical reality carries out all those 
possibilities. So we would live in a multiverse where all the possible universes within the 
frame of string theory are also real universes. 
As to the quantum loop hypothesis, it so happens that the first tentative 
cosmological models being developed within this frame −Bojowald models− suggest that 
our universe suffered a process of collapse previous to the Big Bang described by the 
standard cosmology. This has reinforced Smolin's conjecture that this universe could have 
resulted from a gravitational collapse inside a larger physical reality. In other words, one 
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universe may give origin to another, inside one of its black holes. Once again, the 
multiverse scenario. 
Finally, the multiverse hypothesis has been proposed as a solution to the problem 
of the fine tuning of physical constants and laws. This problem can be stated thus: since 
the eighties, we have a detailed standard model, both in cosmology and in particle physics, 
that makes it possible to analyze, theoretically and through computer simulations, questions 
such as the consequences for the cosmos of slight changes in some of the parameters 
exhibited by these models. The result of these researches has been the discovery that a 
certain number of these parameters, both in the standard cosmological model as in the 
standard particle physics model, give the impression of being finely tuned, in the sense that, 
if they had had values minimally different from those they actually have, life in the cosmos 
−and in many cases every complex structure− would have been physically impossible. 
Some authors interpret this fact as an inkling that our universe is nothing but a 
single domain in a much larger reality, in such a way that we inhabit just that domain of 
reality where the appropriate conditions prevail for the existence of life as we know it. 
The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis 
provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. 
But before discussing this, we should have an idea of what these peculiarities are. We will 
devote the next section to this issue. 
 
2. The fact of the fine tuning of the universe 
All along the last century, especially in its last decades, a surprising fact about the 
universe where we live has been discovered: the fact that its architecture possesses very 
peculiar properties, in the sense that very slight changes in the combination of physical laws 
and constants of nature would have the consequence that the cosmos would become a 
physical system hostile to the development of life and possibly hostile too to the 
development of any form of complex entities (at least those based on chemistry). The fact 
that the universe behaves following one of the (at least apparently) scarce hospitable 
combinations of laws and constants is known as the «fine tuning» of the laws of nature. In 
order not to leave this exposition in a too abstract plane, we shall mention a few concrete 
examples of this tuning. These examples have been taken from Robin Collins paper «The 
evidence of fine tuning», one of the clearest presentations of the matter.  
(a) The cosmological constant: 
«The smallness of the cosmological constant is widely regarded as the single 
greatest problem confronting current physics and cosmology. [...] Apart from 
some sort of extraordinary precise fine-tuning or new physical principle, 
today’s theories of fundamental physics and cosmology lead one to expect [...] 
an extraordinary large effective cosmological constant, one so large that it 
would, if positive, cause space to expand at such an enormous rate that almost 
every object in the Universe would fly apart, and would, if negative, cause the 
Universe to collapse almost instantaneously back in on itself. This would 
clearly make the evolution of intelligent life impossible. 
What makes it so difficult to avoid postulating some sort of highly precise fine-
tuning of the cosmological constant is that almost every type of field in current 
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physics [...] contributes to the vacuum energy. [...] [When] physicists make 
estimates of the contribution to the vacuum energy from these fields, they get 
values of the energy density anywhere from higher 
5310  to 
12010 than its 
maximum life-permitting value»5. 
(b) The strong and the electromagnetic forces: 
«A 50 percent decrease in the strength of the strong force, for instance, would 
undercut the stability of all elements essential for carbon-based life, with a 
slightly larger decrease eliminating all elements except hydrogen»6 
«[Around] a fourteen-fold increase in the electromagnetic force would have the 
same effect on the stability of elements as a 50 percent decrease in the strong 
force»7. 
(c) Carbon production in stars: 
«[A] change of more than 0.5% in the strength of the strong interaction or 
more than 4% in the strength of the Coulomb [electromagnetic] force would 
destroy either nearly all C or all O in every star. This implies that irrespective 
of stellar evolution the contribution of each star to the abundance of C or O in 
the ISM [interstellar medium] would be negligible. Therefore, for the above 
cases the creation of carbon-based life in our universe would be strongly 
disfavored»8 
(d) The proton/neutron mass difference: 
«The neutron is slightly heavier than the proton by about 1.293 MeV. If the 
mass of neutron were increased by another 1.4 MeV −that is, by one part in 
700 of its actual mass of about 938 MeV− then one of the keys steps by which 
stars burn their hydrogen to helium could not occur [...]: 
p+p→deuteron+positron+electron neutrino+0.42 MeV 
[...] On the other hand, a small decrease on the neutron mass of around 0.5 to 
0.7 MeV would result in nearly equal numbers of protons and neutrons in the 
early stages of the Big Bang [...] resulting in an almost all-helium universe»9 
Accepting thus that there is a delicate tuning of the laws and physical constants, 
without which the development of complex chemical structures would not have been 
possible, especially life (and most especially intelligent life, whose appearance requires 
doubtlessly that favorable conditions are maintained much longer than what is required by 
one-cellular life), the question is how to interpret this fact. What does this fine tuning tell 
us about the physical reality? Is it a meaningful datum, or mere chance? And if the former, 
what does it entail? What is it pointing at?  
In the latest years, some authors suggest that fine tuning is an inkling that the 
cosmos is much wider than we assumed and is made of domains with different 
                                                 
5 COLLINS (2003) 180-181. 
6 Ibidem 182-183. Taken from BARROW - TIPLER (1986) 326-327. This book from Barrow and Tipler is the 
very classical exposition on fine-tuning of the universe, and, as such, it is highly recommended for the 
interested reader. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Ibidem 185. Cited from OBERHUMMER et al. (2000) 90. 
9 Ibidem 186-187. 
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combinations of laws and constants, in which case we must inhabit one of those oasis 
favorable to life in the middle of a mostly inhospitable physical whole. This is equivalent to 
propose the multiverse as the explanation of the fine tuning observed in the cosmos. 
Now then, under which conditions can the multiverse really explain the fine tuning 
of our universe? We will tackle this question in the next section. 
 
3. Types of multiverse and their adequacy to explain the fine tuning 
To explain the fine tuning of the universe, the multiverse has to meet certain 
requirements. In the words of Bostrom: 
 
«A multiverse theory can potentially explain cosmological fine-tuning, 
provided several conditions are met. To begin with, the theory must assert the 
existence of an ensemble of physically real universes. The universes in this 
ensemble would have to differ from one another with respect to the values of 
the fine-tuned parameters, according to a suitably broad distribution. If 
observes can exist only in those universes in which the relevant parameters 
take on the observed fine-tuned values (or if the theory al least implies that a 
large portion of all observers are likely to live in such universes), then an 
observation selection effect can be invoked to explain why we observe a fine-
tuned universe. Moreover, in order for the explanation to be completely 
satisfactory, this postulated multiverse should not itself be significantly fine-
tuned. Otherwise the explanatory problem would merely have been postponed; 
for we would then have to ask, how come the multiverse is fine-tuned? A 
multiverse theory meeting these conditions could give a relatively high 
conditional probability to our observing a fine-tuned universe»10 
 
Let us now ask what multiverse could meet these requirements. In the specialized 
literature there are several types of entities called «multiverse». The main ones are the 
following: 
1. On the first place, we find authors who give the name of multiverse to the infinite 
universe, following this reasoning: the observable universe, the environment which 
includes all the objects whose light has reached us since the Big Bang11 to our time, has 
now a radius of about 26104 ⋅  meter; the volume of the corresponding sphere is called 
«the Hubble volume». It is thus a partial domain inside the infinite universe. Everything 
we could examine, whatever the power of our telescopes, is included inside our Hubble 
volume. If there is something beyond, we don't know, and it can never affect us 
causally. In fact, for us, its existence does not matter. Under a purely empiricist 
criterion (which we are far from enforcing) we could say that the assertion that there is 
something beyond the Hubble volume is not even scientific. 
                                                 
10 Bostrom (2007) 439-440. 
11 Actually we can only receive the light emitted after what is usually called the «surface of final dispersion», 
the instant when radiation uncoupled from matter. This happened about 100,000 years after the Big Bang. 
But these details are not important here. After all, 100,000 years are not much... at the cosmological scale. 
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Some authors suggest that we should consider every sphere of the same size as our 
observable universe as a full-fledged universe. Since an infinite universe would contain 
infinitely many spheres of this kind, they give it the name of multiverse. 
Actually this terminology is a rather unfortunate choice, because it makes us take as a 
set of different entities what really makes a single physical system ―the open universe― 
endowed with a high degree of unity, which cannot be decomposed in «sphere-
universes» or any other cosmological sub-unities, except in an arbitrary way. 
2. The second type of multiverse derives from physical hypotheses which have not 
reached an empiric support that would allow them to become standard theories, but a 
certain number of specialists trust that they are adequate to reality, and try to develop 
them and provide the empiric support they still lack. In this group we may rank the 
multiverse derived from the eternal inflation scenario proposed by Linde and Vilenkin; 
the multiverse containing the so-called «cosmic landscape», i.e. all the possible 
realizations of superstring theory; the scenario defended by Smolin of multiple 
universes generated in black holes; and similar conjectures. In this case, the term 
multiverse is used to represent something completely new ―as against the infinite 
universe.― In all these scenarios, the various domains differ structurally from one 
another. This means that the laws of physics can be partially different in each domain, 
although all of them obey a common general physical structure. On the other hand, 
each of the cosmic domains is completely ―or almost completely― causally 
disconnected from the others. Therefore each can be considered as an authentic 
«universe island» which would continue its evolution according to its own dynamics 
although the remainder of the universe disappeared in an immense cosmic cataclysm. 
3. Finally, since a few years ago, the possible existence of a multiverse incomparably larger 
than the former is being discussed. This idea, proposed by the physicist Max Tegmark, 
consists in assuming that: 
«[...] mathematical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so that all 
mathematical structures exist physically as well»12. 
Tegmark's suggestion results in the conception of a multiverse where every possible 
combination of laws and natural constants occurs in fact in one or another domain of 
reality. In the cosmic scenario proposed by Tegmark, there are no privileged mathematical 
structures, nor privileged initial or boundary conditions, nor physical constants of any type 
whose values are restricted to such and such concrete value. Every consistent mathematical 
structure is realized. (Or, more precisely, every consistent mathematical structure is a 
physical universe). The only reason behind the peculiarities of the universe we observe is 
anthropic: we just observe the world which is consistent with our own existence. 
In fact, this third type of multiverse is the only one that provides us with an 
scenario which does not leave room for the question about the actual values of the physical 
constants, nor the question of why physical laws are what they are. That is, only a 
multiverse which realizes all the consistent mathematical structures seems a candidate with 
possibilities to solve the question of the fine tuning of the universe, for in the other 
multiverses this question appears again, this time in the multiverse frame. 
To see that this is so, let us look at a concrete example: the cosmic landscape of 
string theory may contain about 101000 structurally different universes, but they share 
                                                 
12 TEGMARK (2004) 483. 
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common features, such as this: all of them possess physical laws of the quantum type. 
None of these universes may be ruled, for instance, by a Newtonian physics frame. This is 
an interesting detail, as the huge importance of quantum effects for the appearance of the 
chemical structures basic for life makes us suspect that, if the multiverse contained only 
worlds based on variations of classical physics, not one of them would be apt for the 
existence of life nor in general for the existence of complex chemical structures. Therefore, 
whatever the enormous size of the superstring cosmic landscape, it is still a biophile 
scenario which suggests design, in contrast with the unrealized possibilities of completely 
sterile multiverses. 
Most of the multiverse models proposed up to now −those of Linde, Vilenkin, 
Susskind, Smolin, etc.− are subject to this problem: they only realize a too small number of 
all the possible physical structures. Therefore, the fact that one of them is apt for life and 
other complex systems is still surprising. 
Let us underline this: to notice the limitation of these multiverses, at first sight so 
vast, what we must do is look at them from the −incomparably larger− perspective of all 
the mathematical structures which could be considered as the basis for the laws of a 
possible universe. In other words: in principle, if we start from the set of logically possible 
universes, it is possible to define in them a great variety of subsets (which would be the 
possible multiverses), as well as a great variety of mechanisms generating such subsets13. 
And each of these subsets of universes, together with each of their possible generating 
mechanisms, will possess certain features, more or less favorable for the development of 
complex structures, living beings, intelligent observers, or any other type of realities. What 
eventually takes us again to a situation of fine tuning which should be explained. In the 
words of Stoeger:  
«If we do have good evidence, and an adequately specific model for, the 
multiverse to which our own universe belongs, thus providing some 
explanation for its bio-friendly characteristics, this would not be a complete 
−let alone an ultimate− explanation. We would still require an explanation for 
the existence and bio-friendly character of the multiverse itself (bearing in 
mind that there is no unique prescription for it) and for the process through 
which it emerged [...]»14. 
For this reason, many authors have come to the conclusion that the postulate of 
this kind of multiverse just poses the problem of design in a new plane. In the words of 
Davies: «Multiverses merely shift the problem up one level»15. 
How can this be solved? In principle, it seems that the only solution is the 
mathematical multiverse proposed by Tegmark. Evidently, the mathematical multiverse is 
quite different from the others. In this multiverse there are no mathematical structures (or 
no particular values of constants) privileged, thus there remains no room for design and 
choice (or chance). In other words, starting from the physical existence of all mathematical 
consistent structures, the objections placed (among others) by Davies and Stoeger do not 
apply. 
                                                 
13 Consult about this, for instance, the thoughts by Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger about the set of physically 
possible universes and the different kinds of subsets (multiverses) definable in it. These thoughts can be 
found in the following papers: ELLIS – KIRCHNER – STOEGER (2003), and STOEGER – ELLIS – KIRCHNER 
(2004). 
14 STOEGER (2007) 455. 
15 DAVIES (2007) 497. 
 10
Let us thus look at the next question: Is the mathematical multiverse a viable 
explanation of the fine tuning of the laws and natural constants of our universe? Can we do 
something to test this scenario? Or is this just an unwarranted speculation? We will tackle 
this in the next section. 
 
4. Predictions from the mathematical multiverse hypothesis. Cellular automata as a 
way to test them 
It does not seem easy to derive, from the hypothesis of the mathematical multiverse 
(or actually from any other variant of the multiverse hypothesis) concrete predictions 
relative to our world. However, something can be done. If we start from the hypothesis 
that we live in a typical universe in the set of all the universes consistent with our existence 
−the so-called «mediocrity principle»16, which can be vindicated by means of statistical 
arguments− there are at least three assertions (proposed by Tegmark) which should take 
place. The first two can be formulated as follows: 
«―Prediction 1: The mathematical structure describing our world is the most 
general among those consistent with our observations. 
―Prediction 2: Our observations are the most general consistent with our 
existence.»17 
The third statement is the following: 
 «Our future observations are the most general among those consistent with 
our past observations.»18 
As in the case of the second prediction, what is being stated here is the fact that the 
behavior of the universe we observe cannot be more specific than what is strictly necessary 
to guarantee our existence. What will happen in the future should be determined only, and 
in the most general way, −consistent with the anthropic condition− by what has been 
observed in the past. Thus we should not expect that nature exhibits unnecessary 
                                                 
16 The «mediocrity principle» and the way in which this principle can be used to make predictions in the 
context of the multiverse hypothesis have been explained e.g. in VILENKIN (2006) chapter 14. Similar ideas 
(in a non cosmological context) had been proposed earlier by John Leslie and Richard Gott [See e.g. GOTT 
(1993)]. Gott called this principle «Copernican anthropic principle», but it is basically the same idea. 
Anthropic reasoning and predictions based in the «mediocrity principle» have been subject to some criticism. 
In the words of Vilenkin: 
«The best we can hope for is to calculate the statistical bell curve. Even if we calculate it 
precisely, we will only be able to predict some range of values at a specified confidence level. 
Further improvements in the calculation will not lead to a dramatic increase in the accuracy of 
the prediction. If the observed value falls within the predicted range, there will still be a 
lingering doubt that this happened by sheer dumb luck, If it doesn’t, there will be doubt that 
the theory might still be correct, but we just happened to be among a small percentage ob 
observers at the tails of the bell curve. 
It’s little wonder that, given a choice, physicists would not give up their old paradigm in favor 
of anthropic selection. But nature has already made her choice. We only have to find out what 
it is. If the constants of nature vary from one part of the universe to another, then, whether we 
like it or not, the best we can do is to make statistical prediction based on the principle of 
mediocrity» VILENKIN (2006) 151. 
17 TEGMARK (1998) 4. 
18 TEGMARK (2007) 120. 
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regularities along time. In this way, we can consider this third prediction a particular case of 
the second. 
The problem, anyway, is that these assertions are so general that it is not easy to see 
how they could be refuted by means of concrete observations about the structure of our 
world. 
In the ideal case, a scientist doing research in this area should be able to study 
several universes with laws similar to ours (to a certain extent), so as to test the result of 
altering in some way the laws of nature. Do we really observe the most general laws 
consistent with our existence? Are our future observations the most general among all 
those consistent with our past observations? For instance, up to now everything seems to 
point to the fact that neither the laws nor the constants of nature in our universe change 
with time. Does this mean that, if they exhibited a minimal variability, they would be 
unable to generate structures such as the vast variety of complex systems (chemical and 
biological) that we see in our world? 
In the ideal case, the scientist would choose a sample of universes, some identical 
to ours, some with a certain variability of the laws of nature (or other variation providing 
those laws with a more general formulation than ours); and would find whether intelligent 
life, or, in general, complex chemical systems, becomes impossible in those universes. If 
this is not the case, we would be living in a universe with specially simple laws among those 
universes compatible with life as ours, and predictions 2 and 3 in Tegmark's proposal 
would be falsified. 
Well, it is evident that we do not have a sample of universes to perform such a 
study. But perhaps we can reach the same goal in an indirect way, by studying a type of 
mathematical structures that can exist in multiple variations, and which generate worlds −at 
least in the context of the mathematical universe, where every consistent mathematical 
structure must be considered a world− where, depending on the rules and the initial or 
boundary conditions selected, complex entities may or may not appear and stay living. 
Cellular automata19 (CA in short) make an interesting case of this type of 
mathematical structures. They consist of the following components: (1) a discrete space of 
dimension Zn ∈  divided in cells; (2) a finite set of possible states for each cell; (3) a certain 
number (the same for all cells) of neighboring cells; and (4) a transition rule that fixes the 
next state of each cell as a function of its current state and the states of its neighboring 
cells. Time is considered a set of discrete instants, i.e. Zt ∈ . Alternatively, a CA can be 
seen as a set of finite deterministic automata (FDA) distributed in discrete cells along a 
regular grid. The inputs of the automata are the sets of states of their neighbors; the 
neighborhood is the same along the grid. CA can be one-dimensional (if the grid is a string 
of cells), bi-dimensional (when the grid is a surface), or higher-dimensional. 
Cellular automata are very useful for the question we are trying to research, because 
they have two very interesting properties: 
(1) CA provide us with models of «universes» regulated by rules easy to 
describe. Thus, the development of an automaton-universe (provided with certain initial 
conditions) can easily be followed with the help of computers. 
(2) Some automaton-universes show close analogies to our cosmos. 
                                                 
19 See NEUMANN (1966). 
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The first analogy is simple and links the types of universes described by CA with 
those that arise from changes in the laws of our world. Just as most of the variations of our 
laws of nature lead to uninteresting universes without complex structures, while a few 
combinations (such as the laws of our universe) make the development of a wide variety of 
complex structures possible; in a similar way, most of the CA rules lead to «universes» 
which generate monotonous (steady or periodic) or chaotic configurations, while some 
rules make the development of a wide variety of complex structures possible. 
Beyond this, it has also been shown that the set of complexity-generating CA 
produce dynamic systems with amazing parallels to physical systems of our world.  
Reiner Hedrich summarizes this point as follows: 
«It seems to give crucial parallels between these mathematical models 
and the real systems of our nature. Many of the concepts and characteristics 
that were already known by the systems of nature and older theoretical 
approaches are also found in the investigation of the macro-behavior of 
cellular automata. This includes, for example, symmetries, conservation laws, 
reversibility and irreversibility (time arrow), macroscopic order parameter, self-
organization phenomena, periodicity and aperiodicity [...], light cone structures, 
non-separability of space areas as a result of interactions, deterministic chaos 
[...] and complex pattern formation»20. 
Against this background it seems justified to use CA as a base to explore the 
question of the typical characteristics of the mathematical structures that can produce a 
complexity-generating universe. 
This conclusion may be further strengthened if we consider the research of Stephen 
Wolfram and his co-workers about the structures of all types of natural systems, not 
excluding those of living beings. These studies strongly support the view that the similarity 
between cellular automata generated systems and natural systems is not a mere analogy, but 
the dynamics of automata are precisely the mechanism that nature uses to generate the 
complex structures of our world21. 
The most famous of the complex (sometimes called fractal) automata is the so-
called «game-of-life», which we will tackle extensively in the next section. Such is the 
analogy between what happens in this automaton and the real world, that the «game-of-
life» has been used by authors such as Daniel Dennett as an illustration of how a world 
ruled by a simple and strict physics may give rise to structures strongly analogous to living 
beings, in the sense that, like living beings, they should be described with a language of 
«intentions», «risk avoiding», «anticipation», «open opportunities», and so forth22. 
All these facts make of cellular automata in general, and complex cellular automata 
of the «game-of-life» type in particular, a set of mathematical objects key for the study of 
the predictions of the mathematical multiverse. The CA provide us with possible worlds 
which sometimes contain classes of objects at least analogous in complexity to those in our 
own universe. This gives us the opportunity to investigate what happens to the complexity 
                                                 
20 HEDRICH (1990) 201-202. For more information about this see HEDRICH (1990) 191-202 and HEDRICH 
(1994) 94-106. 
21 See WOLFRAM (2002) cap. 7-8. 
22 See DENNETT (2003) cap.2. 
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of those worlds when the rules of the interesting automata are made more general and 
complicated. 
For instance, it is evident −at least to the degree of precision reached by our best 
instruments− that the laws and constants of nature do not experience any temporal 
variation in our world. Is this a necessary prerequisite for a universe to generate complex 
structures as ours? Or is this a case of a strange simplicity within the set of universes with 
rules that allow interesting structures to appear? That is, do we live, or not, in a typical 
universe in the set of those that generate dynamics similar to our world, as we should 
expect, according to the predictions of the mathematical universe?  
We shall try to answer this question in the next section. 
 
5. Cellular automata considered as universes. Experiments on the influence on 
complex structures of changes in the laws 
As already said, a cellular automaton can be seen as a set of finite deterministic 
automata distributed in discrete cells along a regular grid. When the grids are finite, 
boundary conditions become essential. They determine, for instance, which is the left 
neighbor of the leftmost cell.  
A given CA can be tested (executed) with different initial conditions: the initial 
states of all the cells in the grid.  
To explore what happens to the automata generating complex configurations when 
changes are made that turn their rules time-dependent, we have performed experiments 
with one and two-dimensional automata. 
 
5.1 Experiments with one-dimensional cellular automata 
The simplest one-dimensional CA is a linear string of cells, each containing an 
FDA. Each automaton in the string has the same set of n possible states; a set of 
neighbors, defined by the number (k) of neighboring cells to its left and to its right, the 
same for all the FDA; and a transition function (the rule of the CA, also the same for all), 
which defines the next state of each automaton in the string as a function of its own 
current state and the states of its neighbors.  
In our experiments, we have worked with one-dimensional CA with the following 
properties:  
• Number of states: n=2, represented by 0 and 1. State 0 will be called «dead» and 
state 1 will be called «alive». 
• Maximum neighboring distance: k=2, which means that the number of neighbors 
for each cell is 4 (two to the left and two to the right). 
• Therefore, the next state of each cell is a function of five binary variables (the state 
of the cell itself and its four neighbors). The number of different possible rules is 
thus 232. A given rule can be defined by a 32 bit binary string such as the following: 
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01001011010010110100101101001011, where each bit defines the next state of 
each cell for all the possible values of the five input variables in the natural order. 
• An additional restriction is imposed on the rules to prevent spontaneous 
generation: when the current state of a cell is «dead» and the states of all its 
neighbours are «dead», the next state of the cell must be «dead». This means that 
the rule of the CA must always start by 0, and the number of possible rules 
becomes 231. 
• For our tests, we have selected a CA grid with cyclic boundary conditions. 
Stephen Wolfram classified23 one-dimensional CA into four broad categories: (i) 
Class 1: ordered (static) behavior; (ii) Class 2: periodic behavior; (iii) Class 3: random or 
chaotic behavior; (iv) Class 4: complex behavior. The first two are totally predictable. 
Random CA are unpredictable. Somewhere in between, in the transition from periodic to 
chaotic, a complex, interesting behavior can occur.  
Since the total number of rules is too large to allow for a systematic study, we have 
selected at random four automata with rules which generate a complex behavior, and 
explored what happens when one or two mutations are applied to these rules. Tables 1 and 
2 show the results. The Complex/Chaotic corresponds to the case when the modified CA 
displays a complex behavior for some initial conditions, and a chaotic behavior for others. 
The following initial conditions have been used: a) A single one in the middle of a series of 
600 zeros. b) 1100 repeated to make a 601 string. c) Three consecutive ones in the center 
of a 598 long string of zeros. 
Table 1. What happens when all possible single mutations are applied to a CA with 
complex behavior. 
Rule Complex Chaotic Complex
/Chaotic 
Ordered/
Periodic 
Total 
0100101101001011
0100101101001011 
21 1 0 9 31 
0101011001101110
1110111010000000 
9 20 2 0 31 
0110011001100110
0110011001100110 
9 14 3 5 31 
0011110000111100
0011110000111100 
10 12 2 7 31 
 
Table 2. What happens when all possible consecutive double mutations are applied 
to a CA with complex behavior. 
Rule Complex Chaotic Complex
/Chaotic 
Ordered
/Periodic 
Total 
0100101101001011 14 3 2 11 30 
                                                 
23 See WOLFRAM (2002). 
 15
0100101101001011 
0101011001101110
1110111010000000 
3 26 1 0 30 
0110011001100110
0110011001100110 
0 17 8 5 30 
0011110000111100
0011110000111100 
5 12 1 12 30 
These tables show that the behavior of the automata changes from complex to 
ordered, periodic, or, most frequently, chaotic, when its rule (i.e. one of the laws of nature 
for a world regulated by its rule) is modified; but in a significant number of cases, the 
automaton maintains a complex behavior after the change. 
The next tests were performed on the second CA in tables 1 and 2. This CA has 
been designed with a rule similar to the laws of our universe, according to the following 
considerations: 
1. The rule is symmetric, i.e. the neighbors to the left have the same effect as the 
neighbors to the right. 
2. Too few neighbors or too many neighbors tend to cause the «death» of the central 
cell (as in the Game of Life). 
3. About one half situations cause cells to become «alive», the other half make them 
«dead». According to Langton, this makes complex behavior more probable. 
As indicated in the tables, the rule for this automaton is the following: 
01010110011011101110111010000000. If the rule of this CA is applied a single mutation, 
symmetry is lost and the complex behavior for the indicated initial conditions becomes 
chaotic. However, if we apply a double mutation which maintains symmetry, the behavior 
of the CA will still be complex. The same happens with other double mutations which also 
keep the symmetry. 
We next complicated the «laws of nature» in this universe, applying the original rule 
for some time during the evolution of the CA, then applying a double mutation for some 
time, and letting the CA go back to its original rule. In general, we got a complex behavior, 
even though the evolution in each case is visibly different from the corresponding histories 
of the original CA. Finally, the double mutation was applied in every generation with a 
probability of 1 in 1000.  
These experiments show that the CA-universes which exhibit an interesting 
behavior (i.e. a complex behavior) do not lose it automatically if they suffer certain changes 
in their rules. This suggests that the most general form of the laws of nature allows for a 
certain time variability in those laws.  
Of course, the actual histories of the modified universes will be different. Also, 
from so general a perspective, we cannot say what will happen to a given structure in a 
complex world when its laws are complicated with changes of any type (for instance, by 
introducing temporal changes in the laws, as shown in the experiments). But we can 
certainly expect at least that many variations of such universes will allow the existence of 
entities of analogous complexity. 
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5.2 Experiments with bi-dimensional cellular automata 
To study what happens to particular structures in a complex world when changes in 
the laws occur, we decided to analyze bi-dimensional automata of the Game-of-Life type24, 
one of the best explored up-to-now. 
The 2-D CA called the Game-of-Life was designed by John Conway. It consists of 
a matrix of cells, where each cell may take one of two states: alive and dead (respectively 
represented by one and zero). Each cell has eight neighbors. At every time step, also called 
a generation, each cell computes its new state by determining the states of the cells in its 
neighborhood and applying the transition rules to compute its new state. Every cell uses 
the same update rules and all the cells are updated simultaneously. The next state of a cell is 
determined by the rule B3/S23, which means that cells are born (go from the dead to the 
living state) if they have exactly three living neighbors, and survive (stay in the living state) 
if they have two or three living neighbors. In all other cases, a cell dies or remains dead. 
The game of life is particularly interesting to study the general form of the laws that 
give rise to complex structures, because in the last decades a large number of structures 
generated by this automaton have been studied, and several analogies between the 
dynamics of these structures and the dynamics of the chemical and biological systems in 
our world have been proposed. 
Different variants of the game of life have been defined. HighLife, for instance, 
differs because its rule is B36/S23 (i.e. a cell is also born if it has 6 living neighbors). Life-3-
4 has the rule B34/S34 (cells are born or survive if they have 3 or 4 living neighbors). Seeds 
is a CA with the rule B2/S (a cell is born if it has exactly two living neighbors, but it never 
survives). And so forth. For symmetric rules of the game-of-life type, the number of 
possible different rules is 216, most of which do not entail a complex behavior. If symmetry 
is not forced, the number of possible rules is much higher (2512). 
In our experiments, we have developed a genetic evolution program25 which selects 
some of the most «interesting» initial conditions for Life and other rules and rule 
combinations: those which give rise to a good number of interesting small structures, 
specially gliders (which make it possible to design logical gates, and thus provide Life with 
the capability of universal computation), but also r-pentominos or exploders. 
What it is obtained thus (with such a program) is a measurement of the fecundity of 
a given rule, that is to say, i.e. its capacity to generate certain complex structures when 
suitable initial conditions occur. This allows us to compare the case of Life (that we already 
know generates a great amount of interesting objects) with those cases where we define 
time-dependent rules.  
Table 3 shows some preliminary results obtained in our experiments, seven for each 
type of rule: Life, HighLife, a periodic mixed rule (Life/HighLife, with the Life rule applied 
for 25 generations, the HighLife rule for another 25, and so on, periodically), and another 
similar mixed rule (Life/B38S23), selecting for both gliders and r-pentominos. For 
comparison, row 4 in this table shows what happened when the evolutionary algorithm was 
                                                 
24 See WOLFRAM (1986). 
25 See more technical details of this program and the related experiments in our paper: ALFONSECA - SOLER 
GIL (2012). 
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changed to select for a different type of object (two simple types of exploders). Just five 
experiments of the latter type have been performed. 
Table 3. Summary of experiments as a function of rule type  
Type of rules Average 
life  
Gliders Perm. 
gliders 
Glider 
life 
R-Pent. Exploders 
Life 578 106 4 33.49 23 71 
HighLife 386 41 0 53.63 5 24 
L→HL→L→... 552 65 4 64.34 13 27 
L→SL→L→... 930 170 1 31.22 44 137 
Life  
(exploders selected) 
938 79 1 24.04 26 88 
 
A few conclusions derived from Table 3:  
• Interesting behavior appears both with Life, Highlife and the two mixed rules. The 
highest score in the genetic algorithm corresponds to one experiment which used 
Life, and the highest number of gliders appeared in another experiment using the 
second mixed rule, but interesting behavior appeared sometimes for all the rules. It 
appears that the rules of Life and B38S23 are somewhat more prone to the 
appearance of «interesting» behavior than the rules of Highlife, while the mixed 
Life-Highlife rule occupies an intermediate position. 
• The life length of an experiment is considered to end when the CA configuration 
goes into a static situation, where the states of all the cells remain the same forever 
(not necessarily dead), or a periodic configuration, where the states of the cells 
oscillate with a certain period. 
• Gliders are generated much more frequently than r-pentominos. Three columns in 
Table 3 show the total number of different gliders generated by the CA with the 
evolved initial conditions for all the experiments associated to a given rule; the total 
number of permanent gliders generated (gliders that are never destroyed by 
colliding with other objects); and the average life of the gliders (permanent gliders 
display periodic behavior).  
• When exploders were not selected for, they appear anyway, relatively frequently. 
On the other hand, the experiments where exploders are selected had a higher 
average life length. 
The next set of experiments tried to find the effect of changing the rules during the 
execution of one of the automata generated in the previous examples. In this case, the 
initial conditions evolved for one type of laws (Life or HighLife) were applied to a CA 
which runs under those laws until generation 46, then changes to the opposite laws during 
the remainder of its «life». Thus, if the automaton was generated using the rules of Life, at 
generation 46 the rules would be changed to HighLife, and vice versa. The results can be 
seen at rows 3 and 4 in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Summary of experiments when initial conditions evolved for Life are used 
with the HighLfe rules and vice versa  
Rules evolved for A, used 
with B 
Average life 
length 
Gliders 
per exper. 
R-Pent. 
per exper. 
Exploders 
per exper. 
Life 578 15.1 3.3 10.1 
HighLife 386 5.9 0.7 3.4 
Life / Life→HighLife 394 5.3 1.6 2.3 
HighLife / HighLife→Life 1827 >16.7 2.9 many 
Life / L→HL→L 791 14.4 3.9 5.9 
Life / L→HL→L→... 478 9 2 4.1 
L→HL→L→... / 
L→HL→L→... 
552 8.3 1.9 3.9 
From their observation we may get the following conclusions: 
• The mixed rule of the form Life→HighLife (with initial conditions evolved for 
Life) generated a less complex behavior (shortest life, less gliders and other 
interesting objects) than the equivalent experiments where the rules of Life were 
allowed to apply always, but a slightly more complex behavior than those where the 
rules of HighLife applied always, with initial conditions evolved for HighLife. 
• The mixed rule of the form HighLife→Life (with initial conditions evolved for 
HighLife) generated a behavior at least as complex (in fact slightly more complex) 
than those where initial conditions evolved for Life were applied to a CA running 
with the Life rules. 
In the next set of experiments of this type, we started with CA with rules of the 
Life type and let it develop for 46 generations; then changed the rules to HighLife, 
executed them for 4 generations, and restored again the rules to Life for the remainder of 
their development. The initial conditions evolved for CA with Life rules where applied to 
these CA. Row 5 in table 4 show the results: a CA of this type performs comparably as that 
with the Life rule.  
In the next set of experiments, we started with CA with rules of the Life type and 
let it develop for 46 generations; then changed the rules to HighLife, executed them for 4 
generations, and restored again the rules to Life. This procedure was repeated periodically 
every 50 generations. The initial conditions evolved for CA with Life rules where applied to 
these CA. Row 6 in table 4 show the results: CA of this type performs slightly worse than 
those with the Life rule, but about the same as CA with periodic rules and initial conditions 
evolved for them (row 7 in the table). 
To end this analysis, we decided to perform a few experiments using completely 
different types of cellular automata: 
• The first we tried was Life-3-4, defined by the rule B34/S34. It resulted not to be 
amenable to this kind of experiments: there are no small long-lived structures 
similar to gliders, and therefore evolutionary algorithms do not seem to work; they 
fail to improve the best score, which is typically reached randomly in the first 
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generation at a very low value, and remains there for the remainder of the 
evolutionary process.  
• Then we tried Seeds, a CA defined by the rule B2/S. With this apparently radical 
rule, however, it is possible to generate structures similar to gliders which move one 
step in a certain direction from one generation to the next. We selected for this 
structure in our evolutionary process. This CA has the problem that the number of 
cells alive increases quickly (in our experiments this happened always before the 
100th «generation»), finally covering about 20% of the available space, and their 
distribution is more or less chaotic, which produces the effect that any glider that 
may appear from this point on will be quickly smothered by the neighboring cells 
and will stay there for just one or two generations. This chaotic behavior seems to 
stay forever, which means that the CA never reaches a static or periodic situation. 
To reduce this effect, we restricted the «life» of the CA to the first 60 generations 
and counted the number of gliders which appeared and their duration. In the two 
experiments performed, 6 and 7 gliders were produced (respectively) with an 
average duration of 11.4 generations. 
• Finally we tried the following mixed case: starting with CA of the Life or HighLife 
type, we let them develop for 46 generations; then we changed the rules to 3-4-Life, 
executed them for 4 generations, and restored the rules to Life or HighLife. Table 5 
shows the results. In some cases, the automata could not recover their former 
complexity after the change: not a single glider was produced after the original rule 
was restored. In other cases, however, new gliders were generated. We can 
conclude that even this drastic change in the rules decreases only moderately the 
average complexity of the development, i.e. sometimes the complexity of a given 
experiment is destroyed, but in other cases the CA is able to recover and proceeds 
to generate new complex behavior for a reasonable number of generations. 
Table 5. Experiments with Life/3-4-Life mixed rules  
Rules evolved for A, used 
with B 
Life 
length 
Gliders R-Pent. Exploders 
Life /  
Life→Life-3-4→Life 
341 9.6 3.9 3.4 
HighLife /  
HighLife→Life-3-4→HighLife 
260 5.6 2.3 4 
Life / Life 578 15.1 3.3 10.1 
HighLife / HighLife 386 5.9 0.7 3.4 
Our conclusion: CA with mixed (time-dependent) rules are fully as capable to 
generate interesting behavior as those with «pure» rules, in some cases even more so. 
We are currently working on the confirmation of the previous results by 
performing a larger number of experiments. We are also looking with more care at CA 
periodic rules that keep the resulting automata computationally complete, as it seems to 
happen with every time-dependent combination of Life and B38S23. 
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6. Discussion of the results 
In this paper, we have checked on the fact that the only version of the multiverse 
that could be a suitable candidate for explaining the fine tuning of the laws of our universe 
to make the existence of complex entities in general and of intelligent beings in particular 
possible is Tegmark's mathematical multiverse. Then we have focused on the question 
whether the peculiar laws of our universe can be explained from the hypothesis that ours is 
a typical «complex-universe» or «life-enabling universe» among the set of all the worlds 
which includes all the consistent mathematical structures. 
In order for this to be the case, the laws of our universe should be the most general 
among those consistent with our existence. To test this, in the previous section we have 
analyzed and proved that the most general form of those complex universes (which must 
exist, according to Tegmark's hypothesis) whose structure corresponds to that of cellular 
automata, are those whose rules exhibit some kind of temporal variability. 
If this result can be extrapolated −and we should not forget that there are 
numerous authors from Martin Gardner to Daniel Dennett who have suggested the 
existence of a very close relation between the «game of life» and our universe26−, it would 
imply that our universe is not typical at all, since it attains a high degree of complexity with 
laws and physical constants specially simple, as they are not a function of time. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that the number of possible universes compatible with life which 
would exhibit some kind of temporal dependence in their laws and physical constants, 
while keeping within the allowable margins of values, must be infinitely more probable 
than those of our type, which means that the probability of our existence in a world such as 
ours would be mathematically equal to zero27. 
                                                 
26 A recent and very interesting study of cellular automata (including the game of life) and its relationship to 
the real universe is Mainzer - Chua (2012). Of course, the use of classical cellular automata has its limitations, 
since most likely the real universe is a quantum universe. In the words of Mainzer and Chua: 
«[...] classic deterministic cellular automata are only approximate models of physical reality, 
which is governed by the principles of quantum physics [...]. Quantum cellular automata 
(QCA) would be more adequate but, of course, not as easy to understand as the toy world of 
classical cellular automata. [...] In principle, it is possible to transform the concept of quantum 
systems into QCA» Mainzer - Chua (2012) 105. 
Some authors as Seth Lloyd have investigated «toy» models of a quantum universe (considered as a quantum 
computer). Lloyd has found that such toy universes evolve complexity and structure naturally and with high 
probability [See e.g. Lloyd (1999)]. This encourages us to think that a transposition of the experiments 
performed here to the context of quantum cellular automata would show that the generation of complexity 
by means of time-dependent rules is perfectly possible in the quantum scenario. But this conjecture should be 
obviously tested in further research. 
27 If the universal constants in our universe are really constant (as most studies seem to imply), then our 
universe can be represented as a point in the configuration space of all the possible values of the constants. A 
universe where the constants were actually variable would be represented by a curve. If those universes are to 
be compatible with life, the point and the curve must lay within the subset of the configuration space that 
makes that compatibility possible. However, the number of points in a subset of space is a continuum-like 
infinite, while the number of curves in the same space is a different infinite, infinitely much larger than the 
continuum. Therefore, the probability of our having been born by chance in a constant universe (the quotient 
of both infinities) would be zero. 
We are aware that current physics allows for some of the constants in our universe not to be so, as shown by 
the present debate on the constancy of the fine structure constant. But it cannot be denied that, in the worst 
case, all our constants are almost constant, which means that, although the actual probability of being in a 
universe like ours may not be exactly zero, it would still be very (perhaps vanishingly) small. 
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In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling 
that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate 
explanation to the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. Multiverses are either too 
small or too large to explain fine-tuning. All the multiverses which have been proposed, 
except the «mathematical multiverse», are too small, so that they merely shift the problem 
of fine tuning up one level. But the «mathematical multiverse» is too large, in the sense that, 
in its context, the simplicity of our world becomes inexplicable. 
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